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Climate Change, Water Scarcity, and the Potential for
Interstate Conflict in South Asia
Abstract
Ever since American security analysts began to consider the impact of global warming on
international security, water has been viewed as an especially critical factor. In many parts
of the developing world, water supplies are already insufficient to meet societal
requirements, and, by shrinking these supplies further, climate change will cause
widespread hardship, unrest, and conflict. But exactly what role water plays in this
equation has been the subject of considerable reassessment over time. When analysts first
examined warming’s impacts, they largely assumed that climate-related water scarcities
would most likely provoke conflict within nations; only later did analysts look closely at the
possibility of conflicts arising between states, typically in the context of shared river
systems. This risk appears particularly acute in South Asia, where several highly-populated
countries, including China, India, and Pakistan, rely on river systems which depend for part
of their flow on meltwater from the Himalayan glaciers, which are contracting as a result of
climate change. In the absence of greater efforts by these countries to address this peril in
a collaborative, equitable manner, looming water shortages could combine with other
antagonisms to trigger armed conflict, possibly entailing the use of nuclear weapons.
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Introduction
Ever since American security analysts began to consider the impact of
global warming on international security, water—or rather, water
scarcity—has been viewed as an especially critical factor. In many parts of
the developing world, it is thought, water supplies are already insufficient
to meet societal requirements, and, by shrinking these supplies further,
climate change will cause widespread hardship, unrest, and conflict. This
understanding of water’s centrality in the climate change-conflict equation
continues to underlie U.S. assessments of warming’s impacts on
international security. However, exactly what role water plays in this
equation has been the subject of considerable investigation over the years.
When American security analysts first examined warming’s impact on the
global security environment, they largely assumed that climate-related
water scarcities would most likely provoke conflict within nations, not
between them. As rainfall diminished, it was assumed, food production
would become more precarious, and various groups within societies,
whether defined along class, ethnic, or religious lines, would compete for
access to the available supplies; when governments proved incapable of
satisfying the mounting demands in an efficient and equitable manner,
conflict would erupt.1 Only later did analysts look closely at the possibility
of conflicts arising between states over climate-related water scarcities,
typically in the context of shared river systems–a quest that would
inevitably lead them to the dangers posed by water competition in South
Asia.
The evolution of strategic thinking on water’s role in precipitating conflict
can be traced through examination of some of the key documents in the
field. Serious study of the topic began in the middle of the first decade of
this century, when analysts in both the military and intelligence
communities undertook the earliest assessments of warming’s impacts on
national and international security. Two seminal documents arose from
these efforts: National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,
published by the CNA Corporation (formerly the Center for Naval
Analyses) in 2007, and the National Intelligence Assessment on the
National Security Implications of Global Change to 2030, submitted to
Congress by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in June 2008.
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The 2007 report, written by staff members at CNA with the assistance of a
Military Advisory Board made up of retired generals and admirals, placed
resource scarcity at the center of its analysis, coining the term “threat
multiplier” to describe warming’s impact on the security equation in poor,
deeply divided societies.2 “Many governments in Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East are already on edge in terms of their ability to provide basic
needs: Food, water, shelter, and stability,” it explained. “Projected climate
change will exacerbate the problems in these regions and add to the
problems of effective governance.” As governments fail and conflict breaks
out among competing factions, the U.S. military may be called upon to
deliver aid and restore stability. “Weakened and failing governments,” the
report stated, “foster the conditions for internal strife [and] extremism.”
Accordingly, “the U.S. may be drawn more frequently into these situations
to help to provide relief, rescue, and logistics, or to stabilize conditions
before conflicts arise.”3
The 2007 CNA report had a significant impression on U.S. military
thinking at the time, both because of the prestige of CNA’s Military
Advisory Board—prominent members included General Gordon R.
Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Anthony C. Zinni,
former commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)—and
because its conclusions accorded well with the observations of many
officers who had been deployed in food and water scarce areas of Asia,
Africa, and/or the Middle East. For many of them, the notion of climate
change as a “threat multiplier,” adding to the resource stresses they were
already witnessing, made perfect sense.4
While the CNA Corporation was undertaking its study, elements of the
U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), spearheaded by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the NIC, were conducting their own investigation of
warming’s impact on global security. This resulted in the publication of a
National Intelligence Assessment on the topic and a summary report of its
contents by Dr. Thomas Fingar, the NIC’s Deputy Director, before the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on June 25, 2008.
Like the authors of the CNA report, Fingar identified climate-induced
resource scarcity as the most worrisome outcome of global warming. As
global temperatures rise and rainfall declines in many areas, he testified,
global warming will devastate agriculture in many areas of the developing
world, resulting in widespread misery and discontent:
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For many developing countries, reduced agriculture output can be
devastating as agriculture represents a large share of their
economy, a majority of their populations rely on subsistence
farming, and their governments and people have less adaptive
capacity.5
When governments fail to overcome these challenges in a fair and effective
manner, he added, unrest and conflict could erupt, “particularly over
access to increasingly scarce water resources.”6
This perception of resource scarcity (especially of water) as the pivotal
impact of climate change on international security, combined with the
threat multiplier concept, was gradually absorbed into official U.S. military
doctrine. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), in its Quadrennial
Defense Review Report (QDR) for 2010, alluded to the 2008 National
Intelligence Assessment (NIA) by noting that “assessments conducted by
the intelligence community indicate that climate change could have
significant geopolitical impacts around the world,” including by
“contribut[ing] to food and water scarcity and through “the further
weakening of fragile governments.”7 It also borrowed from the CNA’s
assessment by stating, “While climate change alone does not cause
conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, putting a
burden on governments around the world.”8 On this basis, the Armed
Services were instructed to work with the militaries of friendly nations to
enhance their capacity to respond to extreme climate events.9
In the years that followed, this summary of warming’s impacts on global
security permeated official U.S. thinking on the subject. “Climate change is
an urgent and growing threat to our national security,” the DoD told
Congress in a 2015 memorandum, “contributing to increased natural
disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources such as food
and water.”10 For example, similar statements were included in speeches
by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in 2013 and 2014,11 and in an
October 2015 speech at Stanford University by National Security Advisor
Susan E. Rice.12
In almost all such statements, water–or rather, water scarcity–was viewed
as a pivotal factor in identifying countries’ vulnerability to the effects of
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climate change, posing a significant threat of instability and conflict.
Typically, moreover, military analysts assumed that any such conflict
arising from water security would occur within states, presumably between
competing factions and ethnic groups. This was widely seen to be the case,
for example, in fighting between pastoralists and farmers in the Sahel
region of Africa, where recurring drought has significantly diminished
water supplies for local groups, exacerbating long-simmering tensions
among them.13 “The genocide in Darfur began, in part, as a drought-driven
conflict,” Rice asserted in her 2015 Stanford speech. “In Nigeria,
prolonged drought contributed to the instability and dissatisfaction that
Boko Haram exploits.”14

The Prospect of Interstate Conflict over Water
Water scarcity continues to figure in DoD studies of the links between
climate change and conflict, but analysts’ assumption that fighting over
scarce water supplies would be confined to intrastate conflict has been
challenged over time. This was first evident in an Intelligence Community
Assessment (ICA) prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in
2012. Released to the public as Global Water Security, the 2012 ICA
reaffirmed the centrality of water in international security affairs but
raised the specter of water conflicts arising between as well as within
states. As in earlier IC reports, the 2012 ICA concluded that water issues,
in combination with pre-existing factors like poverty and social discord,
could contribute to internal unrest and state failure.15 However, the report
went on to consider a range of circumstances in which such issues could
also provoke tensions and conflict between states.
Interstate conflict over water might occur, the ICA indicated, when several
states rely on a shared river system for much of their water supply and one
or more of the riparian states sought to maximize the river’s flow for their
own benefit at the expense of other states in the basin, amplifying any
scarcities already present there. “We judge that as water shortages become
more acute beyond the next ten years, water in shared basins will
increasingly be used as leverage,” the ICA stated. An upstream state
enjoying superior control over a river’s flow might exploit its advantage,
say, to extract advantage in international negotiations or to attract
international aid for infrastructure projects. As the ICA further noted,
“…we assess that states will also use their inherent ability to construct and
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support major water projects to obtain regional influence or preserve their
water interests.”16
The utilization of a state’s superior position in a shared river system to
extract political or economic advantage can prove especially destabilizing,
the ICA suggested, when weaker states in the system (typically the
downstream countries) are especially vulnerable to water scarcity because
of long-standing social, economic, and political conditions. Without
identifying any particular states by name, the study suggested that this
could occur when downstream states suffer from endemic corruption, poor
water management practices, and systemic favoritism when it comes to the
allocation of scarce water supplies. In such cases, any reduction in the flow
of water by an upstream country could easily combine with internal factors
in a downstream country to provoke widespread unrest and conflict.
“Water shortages, and government failures to manage them, are likely to
lead to social disruptions, pressure on national and local leaders, and
potentially political instability,” the report noted.17
Although most discussion of the climate and water security nexus has
continued to emphasize the risk of internal conflict arising from warmingrelated water scarcities, some analysts have pursued the line of inquiry
introduced by the 2012 ICA, focusing on interstate tensions arising within
shared river basins. This was a prominent theme, for example, of a 2013
study conducted by the National Research Council (NRC) on behalf of the
IC. Entitled Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis,
the 2013 NRC report sought to better identify the links between global
warming, pre-existing social vulnerabilities, and the likelihood of conflict.
While it echoed earlier studies by the CNA and NIC in identifying internal
factors like poverty, ethnic discord, and governmental ineptitude as likely
pre-conditions for climate-related conflict, it also examined dangers
arising from dependence on shared river systems, especially in cases
where cooperation among the riparian powers in managing the system is
limited and global warming is expected to reduce future water flows.18
For the NRC, the river systems of greatest concern in this respect were
those that originate in the Himalayan Mountains and depend, for a
significant share of the annual flow, on meltwater from the Himalayan
glaciers. These glaciers are an important source of meltwater for many of
Asia’s major rivers, including the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, and
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Mekong Rivers. These rivers originate in China but travel through India,
Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam–
countries with a combined population of over 3.4 billion people, or
approximately 44 percent of the world’s total population.19 A large share of
the population in these countries depends on agriculture for its livelihood,
so ensuring access to adequate supplies of water is a prime local and
national priority. During the monsoon season, heavy rains provide these
rivers with abundant water, but during dry seasons they are dependent on
glacial meltwater–and, with the rise in global temperatures, the
Himalayan glaciers are melting, jeopardizing future water availability in
these river basins. Given a history of ethnic and social discord within many
of these countries and long-standing tensions among them, analysts fear
that such shortages could aggravate both internal and external tensions
and ignite interstate as well as intrastate conflict.20
As was the case of previous IC-initiated studies, the authors of the 2013
NRC report were reluctant to identify specific countries in their findings,
referring again to “countries of security concern” or other such
euphemisms. However, they did select one of these countries in particular:
Pakistan. They chose that country for special analysis, the report indicated,
because “Pakistan presents a clear example of a country where social
dynamics and susceptibility to harm from climate events combine to
create a potentially unstable situation.”21 Pakistan was said to suffer from
multiple risk factors: Its economy is largely dependent on agriculture;
much of the water used for irrigation purposes comes from just one
source, the Indus River; control over the allocation of irrigation waters is
often exercised by privileged elites, leaving millions of Pakistanis
vulnerable to water shortages; and much of the water flowing into the
Indus comes from China or from tributaries originating in India, leaving
Pakistan in an unfavorable (downstream) position in the system. These
conditions have led, in the past, to internal squabbles over water rights
and to tensions with India over control of the Indus; now, with the
likelihood of diminished meltwater from the Himalayan glaciers, the risk
of water scarcity triggering violent conflict of one sort or another becomes
that much greater.22

Pakistan, the Indus, and U.S. Security
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There is no doubt that Pakistan is considered by U.S. security analysts as a
“state important to U.S. national security interests,” the term used by the
Defense Intelligence Agency to describe countries of concern in the 2012
ICA on water. Not only is Pakistan a critical–if not always wholehearted–
partner in the global war on terror, but it also possesses a substantial
arsenal of nuclear weapons whose security is a matter of enormous
concern to American leaders.23 Should those munitions wind up with
rogue elements of the Pakistani military (some of whose members are
believed to maintain clandestine links to radical Islamic organizations), or
even worse, should Pakistan descend into civil war and the weapons fall
into untrustworthy or hostile hands, the safety of India and other US
allies–as well as of American forces deployed in the region–would be at
grave risk.24 Ensuring Pakistan’s stability therefore, has long been a major
U.S. security objective, prompting regular deliveries of American arms and
other military aid. Yet, despite billions of dollars in American aid, Pakistan
remains vulnerable to social and ethnic internal strife.25
As noted, farming is the principal economic activity in Pakistan, and
ensuring access to water is an overarching public and government
concern. This means, above all, managing the use of the Indus–the
country’s main source of water for irrigation and its major source of power
for electricity generation. Pakistan’s rising population and growing cities,
with their rings of factories, are placing an immense strain on the Indus,
leading to competition between farmers, industrialists, and urban
consumers. With water and power shortages becoming an increasingly
frequent aspect of daily life, public protests–sometimes turning violent–
have erupted across the country. In one particularly intense bout of
rioting, following a prolonged power outage in June 2012, protestors
burned trains, blocked roads, looted shops, and damaged banks and gas
stations.26
However bad things might be in Pakistan today, climate change is likely to
make conditions far worse in the years ahead. Prolonged droughts, climate
scientists believe, will occur with increasing regularity, posing a severe
threat to the nation’s agricultural sector and further reducing the supply of
hydroelectric power. At the same time, warming is expected to increase the
intensity of monsoon downpours, resulting in massive flooding (as
occurred in 2010) and the loss of valuable topsoil, further adding to
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Pakistan’s woes. As the Himalayan glaciers melt, moreover, water flow
through the Indus will diminish.27 With the competition for land and
water resources bound to increase and with Pakistan already divided along
ethnic and religious lines, widespread civil strife will become ever more
likely, possibly jeopardizing the survival of the state.
It is impossible to predict exactly how the United States might respond to
a systemic breakdown of state governance in Pakistan. One thing is clear,
however: At the earliest sign that the country’s nuclear weapons are at risk
of falling into the hands of hostile parties, the American military would
respond with decisive force. In fact, research conducted by the
nonpartisan Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has revealed that the Joint
Special Operations Command (JSOC) and specialized Army units have
been training for such contingencies for some time and have deployed all
the necessary gear to the region. In the event of a coup or crisis, the NTI
revealed, “U.S. forces would rush into the country, crossing borders,
rappelling down from helicopters, and parachuting out of airplanes, so
they can secure known or suspected nuclear-storage sites.” Recognizing
that any such actions by American forces could trigger widespread
resistance by the Pakistani army and/or various jihadist groups, the U.S.
Central Command, which has authority over all American forces in the
region, has developed plans for backing up JSOC personnel with full-scale
military support.28
Another scenario that has some analysts worried is the possibility that a
time of sharply reduced water flow through the Indus will coincide with
efforts by India to exploit its advantageous position as the upper riparian
on three key tributaries of the Indus–the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej–to
divert water for its own use, thereby depriving downstream Pakistan of
vital supplies and provoking a war between these two countries. India was
granted control over the three tributaries under the Indus Water Treaty of
1960, and various Indian leaders have threatened at times to dam the
rivers or otherwise reduce their flow into Pakistan as a reprisal for
Pakistani attacks on Indian bases in the disputed territory of Kashmir
(through which the tributaries flow); this, in turn, has provoked counterthreats from Pakistani leaders.29 What analysts fear most, in such a
situation, is that India, possessing superior conventional forces, would
overpower Pakistan’s equivalent armies, leading Pakistan’s leaders to
order the use of nuclear weapons against India, igniting a regional nuclear
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war. Such a conflict, scientists have calculated, would result in 50 to 125
million fatalities, and produce a dust cloud covering much of the Earth,
decimating global agriculture–an outcome with enormous implications for
American national security.30

China, India, and the Brahmaputra River
The potential for interstate conflict–even nuclear conflict–over shared
water supplies arises in the case of another major river at risk from climate
change: The Brahmaputra, which originates in China and traverses much
of northeastern India before merging with the Ganges in Bangladesh and
emptying into the Bay of Bengal. The fifth-largest river in the world by
volume of water flow, the Brahmaputra starts on the northern slopes of the
Himalayas and flows easterly across the southern Tibetan plateau (where
it is known as the Yarlung Tsangpo) before making a nearly 180-degree
turn and crossing into the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh; from there,
it flows in a southwesterly direction towards its confluence with the
Ganges and thence its exit into the Bay of Bengal. For the Chinese, the
Brahmaputra is an important engine of hydroelectric power; they have
already installed one dam on the river, at Zangmu, and have announced
plans for at least three more. For the Indians, it is a valuable source of
irrigation water, especially in agriculture-dependent regions of the
northeast. Leaders of both countries are fully aware of their counterparts’
interests and concerns over the river but have made little effort to reach a
mutual understanding–let alone any formal agreements–regarding its
future development.31
Several factors make the future status of the Brahmaputra a matter of deep
concern to security analysts. To begin with, the river enters India through
the state of Arunachal Pradesh, an area of northeastern India abutting
Tibet that is claimed by both countries. Beijing insists that this region was
once part of the kingdom of Tibet, and so belongs to China; New Delhi
claims it is a legitimate part of India under a 1914 treaty between Tibet and
Great Britain. The two sides fought a war here in 1962, with India suffering
significant battlefield setbacks but China agreeing to restore the status quo
ante. The countries have not been able to resolve the ownership dispute in
subsequent years, despite intermittent negotiations, and both continue to
maintain substantial military forces in the region. To this day, discord over
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Arunachal Pradesh remains a continuing source of friction in Sino-Indian
relations and a potential spark for violent conflict.32
Another potential source of friction between China and India arises from
Chinese plans (or rumors of such plans) to divert water from the upper
Brahmaputra and funnel it via a series of tunnels and canals to
northeastern China, where existing supplies are hugely inadequate.33
While dismissed by many Chinese experts as overly ambitious and costly,
the notion of diverting water from the Brahmaputra has generated
considerable anxiety in India, where experts fear that the resulting decline
in water flow into the Indian section of the river would threaten
agricultural productivity. Given the centrality of farming in the Indian
economy and political system, any Chinese move to proceed with such a
diversion project could lead to increased tension between the two
countries. 34
Few analysts believe that a Sino-Indian conflict over the Brahmaputra is
likely in the years immediately ahead. Both countries have strong motives
for maintaining friendly–if not necessarily, warm–relations between them,
and water issues have not yet dominated the bilateral agenda. This,
however, is where global warming enters the picture. The Brahmaputra,
like the Indus, draws much of its flow during dry seasons from the melting
of Himalayan glaciers–and these, as has already been noted, are melting
as a result of climate change, and could eventually disappear. For both
China and India, the melting of the Himalayan glaciers will have
momentous consequences. Given the Brahmaputra’s critical importance to
agriculture and economic activity in both countries, any significant longterm decline in its flow would be highly disruptive, causing widespread
hardship and social unrest.35
Under these more stressful conditions, the Chinese leadership, desperate
to provide additional supply to China’s water-starved northeast, might be
more inclined to proceed with water diversion projects on the
Brahmaputra and other shared river systems.36 Coming at a time of
equivalent water scarcity in India, such an effort is almost certain to
trigger a harsh Indian response. “The most salient climate-related point of
conflict [between China and India] could be China’s move to divert the
upstream waters of rivers originating in the Himalayan watershed,” the
NIC warned in a special report on climate change and India. “If China was
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determined to move forward with such a scheme, it could become a major
element in pushing China and India towards an adversarial rather than
simply a competitive relationship. Border clashes related to control of the
rivers are not out of the question.”37
Any conflict between China and India over the waters of the Brahmaputra,
should one occur, is most likely to remain a localized affair, without
provoking a full-scale mobilization of forces on both sides. During the
1962 war over Arunachal Pradesh, Chinese army troops engaged their
Indian counterparts in disputed areas along the border, but neither side
escalated to large-scale combat. However, once fighting breaks out, it is
impossible to predict the succeeding chain of events, and any outcome is
conceivable. A minor skirmish along the Indo-Chinese border might not be
a cause for alarm in the United States, but a larger war between those two
countries undoubtedly would be. Both are armed with nuclear weapons,
and Washington views India as a strategic counterweight to China.38 A
crushing defeat of India would be viewed as a potential threat to American
national interests and might conceivably precipitate U.S. military
intervention. Where that might lead is anyone’s guess, but the mere
possibility of such combat has made this scenario a matter of deep concern
for security analysts in Washington.39

Conclusion
As noted in this article, most analyses of water’s role in the climate-conflict
nexus emphasizes the likelihood that warming-related scarcities will
exacerbate pre-existing antagonisms within poor and divided states,
leading to internal conflict and state collapse. Nevertheless, some analysts
have considered the possibility that water shortages could also lead to
conflict between states, notably if the countries involved depend to a
considerable extent on a shared river system and if one of the riparian
states–typically, the upstream country–diverts the river’s flow for its own
benefit at the expense of downstream countries.
This risk appears particularly significant in South Asia, where several
highly-populated countries rely on a number of major rivers which depend
for a significant part of their flow on meltwater from the Himalayan
glaciers—large frozen reservoirs of water that are contracting as a result of
climate change. In the absence of greater efforts by these countries to
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address this peril in a collaborative, equitable manner, looming water
shortages could combine with other antagonisms to trigger armed conflict,
possibly entailing the use of nuclear weapons. As any such conflict–even
those fought without nuclear weapons–would cause widespread chaos and
economic turmoil, it behooves U.S. leaders to work with their counterparts
in China, India, and Pakistan to promote greater collaboration in the
management of their shared water resources.
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